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The Netherlands
Transatlantic litigation: the Bijlmer air crash case
by Fred J Bruinsma and Leny E De Groot-van Leeuwen
o n Sunday 4 October 1992 at 6.35pm an El Al cargo plane crashed 
into two apartment buildings in 
the south-eastern ('Bijlmer') 
district of Amsterdam, an area 
mainly inhabited by 
immigrants. In the ensuingo o
inferno three crew members 
and a passenger, as well as 39 
people on the ground, were 
killed. Many more were severely
wounded, lost relatives and friends, incurred damages and
suffered from shock.
This article reports on the international litigation aspects of 
the crash. The literature on cross-national litigation has mostly 
concentrated on law firms, and particularly on their 
expansionist tendencies; it has focused on the opening of offices 
and on the forming of global alliances and lacks empirical 
studies on the effects of the everyday work of the lawyers 
themselves in the different types of firms. This is the focus of 
our article. What happened when lawyers and clients on both 
sides of the Atlantic had to deal with each other because of an 
air crash? What strategies did the attorneys follow? How 
successful were Dutch attorneys in their dealings with their 
American colleagues? Did they feel hampered by the Dutch 
'Rules of Conduct' which explicitly proscribe contingency fees?
For an answer to these questions we interviewed the 
following attorneys in the Netherlands: B J H Crans of the law 
firm De Brauw. Blackstone Westbroek (on behalf of Boeing, El
' *• O'
Al, and their insurers), and on behalf of the victims: P S S 
Radakishun and L Soedamah of the Advocatenkollektief 
Bijlmermeer, A H J van den Biesen and Ms A M Willenborg of 
the Advocatenkollektief Nieuwezijds, L D H Hamer of the law 
firm Nolen, B Th Moerkoert of the law firm Trenite van Doorne 
(all in Amsterdam), H Th Bouma, M Dijkstra and J H Lemstra 
of the law firm Pels Rijcken in The Hague, and B van der Goen 
of the law firm with the same name in Soest.
SETTING THE LEGAL SCENE
'Half an hour after the accident I was called from London by the 
solicitor's Jirm of the Lloyds insurers of El Al', said Crans. 'Somebody 
asked me whether I would have a conflict of interests representing El Al. 
I said "No". Next morning at eight o'clock I collected Mark Franklin, 
Peter Martin's associate at Schiphol, and we had ourjirst meeting here 
in my office.'
Since then Crans has been El Al's attorney in the Netherlands. 
Boeing used to have its own attorney in the Netherlands (Ms L 
Dommering, a product liability specialist with the law firm 
Nauta Dutilh), but almost from the beginning Crans's office 
became the intermediary between the Dutch attorneys 
representing the victims and Boeing's own law firm, Perkins
Coie in Seattle. It is unclear, even to Crans, what sort of 
arrangement Boeing, El Al, and their respective insurers made.
One of the first things El Al did was to set up an emergency 
fund, which was operated from Crans's office. Checks on the 
truthfulness of claimant's allegations were made with the help of 
the housing corporation 'Nieuw Amsterdam', which owned the 
two apartment buildings and was much better informed about 
their tenants than the municipal register of the inhabitants. All 
of our interviewees underlined the practical and non-legal 
character of their work during the weeks following the disaster; 
it had more to do with fulfilling basic needs (shelter, medical 
services, relief centres, welfare benefits, insurances, etc.) than 
what is at the core of this article, i.e. disaster litigation, 
American style.
Legal thinking began again on 14 October, when the mayor of 
Amsterdam announced that illegal immigrants who could prove 
they had lived in one of the 230 apartments that had been hit by 
the crashing plane could apply for legalization of their stay in the 
Netherlands. It triggered a wave of legalization requests, not 
only in Amsterdam, but from all over the Netherlands and from 
parts in the world that had nationals living in the Bijlmer, 
especially Ghana, Surinam and Pakistan. A three-room flat, 
allegedly inhabited by more than 30 people, was no exception, 
and rumour had it that one could buy statements of residence 
for Fl 5,000. About 2,000 requests were reduced to 91 
legalizations of illegal residence, and another 38 immigrants 
were granted a residence permit on humanitarian grounds. We 
will not pursue this side issue, but all the attorneys interviewed 
referred to the painstaking process of preparing a well-founded 
compensation claim in close consultation with the client. How 
can you tell the truth from a lie in the absence of documents? 
The victims of most air crashes are the passengers on the 
passenger list. As a consequence, the total number of claims to 
be expected is known shortly after such a disaster. In the Bijlmer 
disaster, however, various categories of an unknown number 
overlap: legal and illegal inhabitants who were not at home, 
relatives and friends watching television at the inhabitant's home 
(a popular sports program was on at the moment of the 
disaster), and people who (claimed they) were nearby and 
suffered shock damage.
The first American case-hunters to arrive (and the last to 
leave) were Philip Stuto, a detective, and Terence Ford, an 
'aviation consultant', who had been expelled from the 
Californian Bar Association for embezzlement. They prepared 
the way for Gerard C Sterns of the law firm Sterns, Walker & 
Lods (San Francisco). From the middle of October they rented 
an office, recruited intermediaries and a Dutch sole 
practitioner, for one purpose only: to acquire as many clients as 
possible, especially in the prized category of next of kin of 
deceased persons and severely wounded victims, under a 
contingency fee contract of 30 per cent. They gave a 
presentation in the Americain hotel, in downtown Amsterdam, 23
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on Monday 19 October. Also in the second half of October, the 
Ghanaian community in the Bijlmer organized a memorial 
service and invited some attorneys. This strange mix of 
mourning and informing was the outcome of a failed effort by 
Sterns to contract the Bijlmermeer Collective. A few days earlier 
he had offered them a group of Ghanaian victims in return for a 
negotiable percentage of his contingency fee. During the 
mourning and informing session Ford showed compassion and 
business instinct at the same time. The Dutch attorneys present 
were disgusted. They said that there was no need to decide on 
the spot and they pointed out that a joint action would lower the 
fee percentage.
Crans thought to do good when he distributed in the relief 
centres a list of attorneys who were members of the Dutch Bar 
section on personal injury. However he aroused the indignation 
of other attorneys who were not on the list but who had had 
experience of the previous air crash three years earlier.
THE MID-ATLANTIC COMPROMISE
On 13 November, Crans organized a meeting in his office, 
which was attended by approximately 25 attorneys. Keith 
Gerrard of Perkins Coie, the Boeing law firm, was present, as 
well as Martin and Franklin. The message they tried to convey to 
the Dutch attorneys was that litigation in the USA would get 
nowhere since the American judge would consider himself a 
forum non conveniens. Secondly, Boeing would act as if liable 
without explicitly saying so. In the background was the 
assumption that a claim-receptive attitude on the part of Boeing 
might persuade any American judge that a denial in the USA 
would not put an end to justified claims. Under the implied 
(implicit) condition that the Dutch attorneys would refrain 
from taking legal action in the USA, Boeing would be willing to 
accept claims via Crans's law firm. Thirdly, American 
compensation standards were out of the question. In particular 
the 'turbo factor', as Crans put it in the interview, of punitive 
damages would be left out. On the other hand in hard cases of 
emotional damage, notably loss of relatives, the very restrictive 
Dutch standard would be relaxed. Overall, the outcome would 
be somewhere between continental Europe and the USA   a 
mid-Atlantic compromise, as it was called.
It was not the message the Dutch attorneys, who had hoped 
for American standards of settlement, wanted to hear. Phon van 
den Biesen, attorney at the Advocates' Collective Nieuwezijds 
felt cheated:
'They wanted to intimidate us. We were given a glossy binder with 
American case law to the effect 'no way in America'. Admittedly, the 
thrust in American law was not so unambiguous as we preferred to have 
it, but it wasn't so evidently impossible as they presented it. '
And indeed, what else could explain the presence of the 
American case-hunters?
Arthur Ballen, attorney of Speiser, Krause & Madole, was 
seated on the second row, just behind Prem Radakishun, 
attorney of the Bijlmermeer Advocates' Collective, on whose 
invitation he had flown in. He scribbled on a note for Prem:
'Do not irritate this man, he is very important. We're going to fix it 
within thirty days. '
That was too optimistic, but Crans was pleasantly surprised 
when Ballen confirmed Gerrard's overview of American law. At
the end of the meeting Ballen called his senior partner, Jerry 
Lear, who came over to sign a contract with the Bijlmermeer 
Advocates' Collective. What made the Bijlmermeer Collective 
decide to work with the Speiser firm? Their attorney, 
Soedamah, said:
T had learned some lessons from this previous air crash three years 
ago. On that occasion I felt obliged to subsume our clients in the 
contract with Podhurst. We were not satisfied with the settlement in 
that case, however. Podhurst gives in too early. What happened three
years ago? Podhurst came with a settlement: take it or leave it. We 
could only take it, and leave him 15 per cent. At the end of October 
Prem asked a friend in New York to do some research on the leading
firms in air crash litigation. The Speiser firm employs a lot of ex-pilots, 
Lear for example, who by the way has also been in the Federal Aviation 
Agency. We knew from the very beginning that America is where the 
money is, if not in proceedings, then in threatening with proceedings. 
Another lesson I had learned was to stay in command. This time we 
stipulated veto power in each individual claim. We ended up with 20 
per cent for Speiser, 5 per cent for us, and 2 per cent expenses.'
A fortnight earlier the Advocates' Collective Nieuwezijds had 
tried to take the lead on the plaintiff's side. Six law firms were 
present at a first meeting: in addition to the two Collectives, 
Nieuwezijds and Bijlmermeer, there was also Hamer (the 
attorney who had visited Miami), J M Beer (another personal 
injury lawyer with his own firm), attorneys of the large 
corporate law firm Trenite Van Doorne, and of the state 
attorney's law firm, Pels Rijcken, which is a law firm with the 
State as its most important client. 'What are you doing here?' 
joked Radakishun to H Th Bouma of Pels Rijcken at the first 
meeting. 'Suppose we decide we will sue the State ...?' 'Then 
you will get all my clients.' The law firm was asked by theJ o J J
political authority of the Dutch Antilles to represent the 
Antillian victims. Did Pels Rijcken consider the problem of a 
conflict of interests? H Th Bouma said:
'Of course. We discussed the problem internally, but also with the 
authorities. We came to the conclusion that neither the Aviation 
Authority nor any other state authority was to be blamed. The official 
report of the Aviation Council on the disaster confirmed this conclusion.'
The Nieuwezijds attorneys and Hamer hoped for a joint 
decision in favour of Podhurst, but not only the Bijlmermeer 
Collective defected. Trenite Van Doorne and Pels Rijcken 
followed a different strategy with an hourly fee and a minimum 
involvement of American attorneys. One attorney with Pels 
Rijcken said:
'We thought it would be immoral that an American attorney would 
earn big money in cases in which liability as such is not an issue, but 
only the amount of money. No cure, no pay supposes that the attorney 
takes a risk. As soon as Boeing agreed not to contest liability there was 
no risk anymore, however.'
B Th Moerkoert, attorney with Trenite Van Doorne, had the 
same mixed feelings:
'The disaster took place here, my clients are here. It is against my 
professional pride to transfer my clients to American attorneys.'
Both firms, however, hired an American attorney on an 
hourly fee: this was Dick Crutch, who was practising law in 
Seattle (in the same building as Gerrard, in fact), for his 
expertise on American law.
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ATTORNEY HOPPING AND CLIENT 
KIDNAPPING
The availability of two different strategies, and of different 
percentages within the contingency fees strategy gave rise to the 
counterpart of ambulance chasing, namely 'attorney hopping'. 
Clients compared their results: the Podhurst connection 
promised 78 per cent of the claim awarded, exclusive of appeal 
litigation, the Speiser connection promised 7 3 per cent of the 
claim, but all-in; what might be called the 'going Dutch' strategy- 
promised unreduced claims, but kept silent on the amount that 
would have to be paid for the litigation. One particular client of 
Pels Rijcken hopped along different attorneys, only to end up 
where he started: with the Pels Rijcken law firm, because only 
here would the attorney's bill be fully paid by the State. Another 
client of Pels Rijcken was more or less kidnapped by a case- 
hunter from Sterns, and plied with alcoholic drinks to become 
their client. A video recording by the Pels Pvijcken firm in the 
revalidation centre, in which the client/patient answered in the 
affirmative to the question 'Is this your attorney?', was needed 
to get the client back. Quite common was the situation in which 
clients asked for a second opinion and got a biased one. The 
Sterns law firm continued its ambulance chasing on the Dutch 
Antilles, where a group of \ictims spent Christmas to recover 
from the shock (their flight tickets paid for by El Al).
None of the law firms used the claim form Crans's firm had 
made. Each law firm went its own way, trying to survive in 
hectic circumstances. In particular the Advocates' Collective in 
the Bijlmermeer became a round-the-clock centre for all sorts 
of problems.
'A lot of people came along to ask us about accommodation, 
household furniture, welfare benefits, insurances ... At first, we worked 
jbr nothing; we didn 't have time to Jill in the legal aid forms. Then we 
became overwhelmed by legalization requests. I remember that a judge 
asked me disbelievingly: "Am I right that you wrote this complaint at 3 
am this morning? That's whatyour fax says. " "Yes, your honour. " In 
the middle of October, when Ford and Sterns had their press conference 
in the city, we had to think about claims against Boeing and El Al. My 
son was born on the 27th of September. Till the end of the year I've 
only seen him during the night.'
While the Biilmermeer Collective did everything themselves,
J J o *
the Nieuwezijds Collective hired two para-legals for the intake 
of the cases. Newsletters kept their clients informed. In the first, 
dated 30 November, they defended their choice for Podhurst, 
referring to the earlier SLM (Surinam Airways) settlement and 
to the bargain of 20 per cent attorney's fee plus 2 per cent 
expenses. (On 7 June 1989 a Surinam Airways DCS crashed at
Table 1: Clients and fee arrangements
Zanderije airport in Surinam. 176 people were killed, ten 
passengers survived. Although most passengers were Surinam or 
Dutch nationals and the disaster took place in Surinam, the case 
had important links with the USA, such as the employment 
agency, Air Crews International, the holding company of SLM, a 
lease and a maintenance contract - all Florida-based.) Table 1 
(below) gives an overview of the client numbers and fee 
arrangements that eventually ensued.
For large firms such as Trenite Van Doorne and Pels Rijcken, 
only the specialized sections on personal injury and/or insurance 
law were involved, but nevertheless that meant 10 hours a day 
non-stop intake conversations with clients. They did the intake 
in teams of attorneys, some of whom, used to well-to-do clients, 
experienced a considerable culture shock:
'Most oj our clients were unmarried mothers on welfare. They only 
trusted their own people, barely spoke Dutch or English. Only one of 
them was insured; he was the only Dutch person ...In these 
circumstances we badly needed their social workers.'
In the first few months the two firms together had about 15 
attorneys on the case. At Crans's office, nine attorneys worked 
day and night during the first month, and it is estimated that the 
firm still spent 1,000 chargeable hours on the case in 1997, five 
years after the disaster.
INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE DANGER ZONE
In the spring of 1993, Gerrard had received most claim files, 
supplemented with a claim assessment by Crans as to the 
probable outcome under Dutch law. At the end of September 
1993 the framework of the settlement became known. It turned 
out to be wholly American in its clear distinction between the 
victims who were within the danger zone and thus eligible for 
compensation and those outside the danger zone who were thus 
without any right to compensation. The danger zone was 
defined as a circle of 100 metres around the zone of impact. The 
zone of impact itself was identified by the house numbers of the 
apartments affected. The following four categories of claims 
were recognised:
(1) next of kin of persons who died in the air crash;
(2) persons living within the danger zone and who were at 
home at the moment of the air crash;
(3) persons who at the moment of the air crash were visiting 
persons in category (2); and
(4) persons who at the moment of the air crash were situated 
within the danger zone and suffered physically as a 
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Several hundred of the approximately 1300 
claims were discarded on the ground that they 
originated from outside the danger zone. It 
seems that Gerrard had an upper limit of 
US$100m in mind, two-thirds for the private 
victims and one-third for the municipality and 
the housing corporations. The compensation 
ranged from US$ 10,000 to US$ 2.3m in the 
case of a severely burnt man. The mid-Atlantic 
compromise boiled down to approximately 
25 per cent of the American standards. 25
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In a newsletter dated 30 September 1993, the Nieuwezijds 
Collective advised its clients within the danger zone to accept 
the offer. The Bijlmermeer Collective used its veto power 
effectively: they went over to Washington and succeeded in 
getting higher compensations for 20 clients in the first two 
categories.
'We were the pain in the ass of the Speiser jirm. We discussed each 
individual claim one by one, and ignored their offer of a lump sum for 
our expenses.'
It remains an open question to what extent the law firms of 
Trenite van Doorne and Pels Rijcken were able to free ride on 
the efforts of the Podhurst and the Speiser connection, but it is 
quite certain that their clients did not have to pay percentages 
of the claim awarded. A tricky legal question was whether the 
clients on welfare would have to pass on their compensations to 
the State. According to legal theory the answer is in the
affirmative, but the authorities turned a blind eye to this: they 
thought it better not to add to the hardship of being a victim by 
debt collecting.
O
At the time of writing, several of the Dutch attorneys 
interviewed have tried to get compensation for clients who were 
outside the danger zone or who have suffered from post- 
traumatic stress syndrome. As the distinction drawn between 
inside and outside the danger zone is unknown in Dutch law, 
some court-awarded compensation might be expected, but 
based only on the low Dutch standards. ®
Fred J Bruinsma and Leny E De Groot-van 
Leeuwen
University of Utrecht/University ofNijmegen
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Legal aspects of oil and gas projects for foreign investors
by Dimple S Bath
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Dimple S Bath
article discusses the 
current legal and regulatory 
framework of the oil and 
gas sector in India and looks at the 
main factors within this framework 
that private investors, in particular 
foreign investors, should ideally 
take note of, including issues such 
as production sharing, canalisation, 
pricing and taxation. The 
Government of India has 
responded to globalisation and the 
concerns of foreign investors by making significant efforts 
towards further liberalising policies and guidelines governing this 
sector. The steps that it has taken towards deregulation are 
considered and in the light of these, some conclusions are 
drawn.
BACKGROUND
The distinct advantages of oil and gas over other forms ofo o
energy have led to their increasingly important role in displacing 
coal and other hydrocarbons as fuel in various sectors, 
particularly in the power sector. Oil contributes 40 percent of 
the world's energy sources, and India (along with China) 
accounts for approximately 12 per cent of global energy demand; 
natural gas contributes nearly 8 per cent to the primary energy 
supply in the country.
There is vast unexplored terrain in India: over 50% of its 
sedimentary basins are totally unexplored, approximately 35% 
of these basins are moderately or poorly explored, and fields 
offered in the past for acreage have been small and marginal.
Development during the 1980s saw a rapid rise in indigenous 
crude oil and natural gas production. The production from the
Bombay High offshore basin contributed to the increase in oil
J O
production. In 1988 89 the production from the Bombay High 
region was 2 1.7m tonnes, accounting for 64 per cent of the total 
crude oil produced in the country, and the gross production of 
its associated and free gas accounted for about 7 per cent of the 
total gas produced in India in that period. Since the early 1980s 
the recoverable reserves of natural gas doubled from 352 billion 
m3 to over 707 billion m 3 . The net production of natural gas in 
1994 95 alone was 17.3 billion m ? and by the end of the 
century the power sector is expected to emerge as the largest 
single user of natural gas.
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
To understand the legal aspects of oil and gas projects in India 
it is important to appreciate the manner in which this area is 
regulated and dominated by the two major public sector 
enterprises: Oil India Limited (OIL) and the Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation (ONGC). Both these undertakings are state-owned 
companies engaged in the exploration, development and 
production of hydrocarbon resources, accounting for 
approximately 92 per cent of the total oil and gas produced in 
the country. Their role in management and decision making, 
particularly with regard to private investment and along with that 
of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MPNG), was 
further strengthened in 1974, when this sector was nationalised.
Refining and marketing of oil is conducted by several public 
sector companies including the Indian Oil Corporation Limited 
(IOC) and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL). 
The state owned enterprises do not seem, at present, keen to 
give up acreage and in fact ONGC is still contesting existing 
awards of acreage on the grounds that with their indigenous 
knowledge and expertise they are potentially the best operators. 
Furthermore, these undertakings are currently, and quite
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